Also see November 1998 - Monthly Update on RMP Electronic
Submission (the meeting where it was announced that OCA (Offsite
Consequence Analysis) would NOT be available on the internet
I have made a copy of the January 6, 1999
40 CFR Part 68
Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements; Risk Management
Programs Under Clean Air Act Section
112(r)(7), Amendments; Final Rule available
for download in Acrobat pdf format (126k)
EPA's Chemical Accident Prevention and
Risk Management Planning (RMP) Webpage
---------------------------------
RTK.NET Mail 496875 Jan 20 14:41:06 1999
Below is a useful reference on the chemical industry's efforts
to impede the public's ability to communicate freely about
chemical accident hazards in communities. For more information,
see http://www.rtk.net/wcs/
[******************************]
SAMPLE OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO
DISCLOSING WORST-CASE CHEMICAL
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
ACT, 112(r).
The Clean Air Act, 112(r), requires an estimated 66,000
facilities that use extremely hazardous chemicals to tell
workers and the public what could happen in a chemical
accident, from the most-likely accident to a worst-case
scenario. These scenarios are part of larger Risk
Management Plans (RMP). Through public disclosure,
Congress intended to prevent pollution, save lives, and
protect property. By law, this is public information, due to
the U.S. EPA by June 21, 1999.
Nonetheless, some in the chemical industry and government
are still resisting full disclosure and are working to restrict
our freedom to communicate about chemical hazards. They
claim that "terrorists" will target facilities if worst-case
scenarios are published on the Internet. However, keeping
information off the Internet does nothing to reduce actual
hazards. Yet neither the EPA, the security agencies,
Congress, nor the chemical industry has a serious,
quantifiable plan and timeline to prevent the hazards that
chemical companies bring into communities. Full
disclosure of accident scenarios is necessary to overcome
this institutional complacency, to encourage safer
technologies, and to honor the public's right-to-know. The
freedom to communicate about chemical hazards is essential
to reducing those hazards-in other words, to achieving real
safety.
Below are sample objections and responses. See more at
www.rtk.net/wcs.
[1] Worst-case scenarios provide a "blueprint" on how to
sabotage industrial facilities.
No, that's a mischaracterization. Risk Management Plans
(RMP) do not include any information about how to
sabotage an industrial facility-no technical data about how
to cause a "worst-case" event, no tank locations, no plant
security information, and no classified information.
[2] Keeping information off the Internet will prevent
"terrorists" from targeting chemical plants.
No, that's disingenuous. Any person already can get
information about the largest and most dangerous facilities
storing chemicals without using the Internet (or using
information already on the Internet). People can obtain
information from the telephone book, direct observation,
trade publications, industry public relations events, common
sense, and other sources, all without using the Internet.
[3] Keeping information off the Internet will protect
communities.
No, keeping worst-case scenarios off the Internet offers no
real protection to communities. To actually reduce hazards,
companies must use safer chemicals, reduce dangerous
storage, widen buffer zones, etc. The freedom to
communicate about chemical hazards enables people to
learn about successes at similar facilities and communities
elsewhere. Only with full information and opportunities to
act can facilities, employees, and communities reduce
chemical hazards. For this, the Internet is a necessary tool.
(See also #10 below).
[4] Disclosing worst-case scenarios will compromise
national security.
No, the U.S. EPA has specifically prohibited facilities from
including any classified information in their Risk
Management Plans (61 FR 31726).
[5] Publicizing worst-case scenarios increases security
burdens on facilities.
No, companies' general duty to operate safely includes site
security (Clean Air Act, 112(r)(1)). Nothing in a Risk
Management Plan increases this responsibility.
[6] Publicizing worst-case scenarios on the Internet
causes a security risk.
No, worst-case scenarios help communities plan for and
prevent chemical hazards. Publication does not create these
hazards. Journalists do not cause the chemical hazards
about which they inform readers. The Augusta (Ga.)
Chronicle, for example, published toxic plume maps from
industry's own PR event (at http://augustachronicle; search
for "Planning for the Worst Maps" in October 1997).
Companies must take responsibility for the hazards they
create.
[7] The EPA is taking sufficient steps to reduce chemical
hazards.
No, the U.S. EPA has never used its clear legal authority
under the Clean Air Act, 112(r)(7)(A) and 112(r)(9), to
reduce the hazards that the chemical industry brings into
communities. Nor do the security agencies, Congress, or
industry have a serious, quantifiable program to prevent
these hazards.
[8] The industry is taking sufficient steps to reduce
chemical hazards.
No, the industry has no quantifiable public pledge and
timeline to reduce worst-case vulnerability zones. Yet
companies can reduce hazards by using safer chemicals,
reducing process pressures or volumes, adding secondary
containment or automatic shutoff devices, widening buffer
zones, etc.
For example, a water treatment plant can replace volatile
chlorine gas with bleach, ozone, or ultraviolet light
disinfectants. A manufacturer can produce and use up
methyl isocyanate-the Bhopal chemical-without storing
this dangerous chemical. A company can replace flammable
solvents with safer water-based materials. Unavoidably
hazardous industries can widen community buffer zones,
such as by moving ammonia tanks away from populated
areas.
[9] An EPA-funded study says putting information on
the Internet increases risks.
No, this is highly inaccurate. The study, by AEGIS,
estimated relative risk using an undefined "x" as the
baseline risk-but if "x" is very small (as experts believe),
then two times "x" is also tiny. Remarkably, AEGIS
omitted from its analysis any benefits from disclosing
chemical hazards to workers, fire departments, and the
public. Further, the report did not explain why use of the
Internet would be necessary to target an industrial facility,
nor did it identify any examples of people using the Internet
to do so. The chemical industry funded a subsequent
AEGIS study.
[10] Providing only local worst-case scenarios satisfies
the public's right-to-know.
No, without ready access to national information people
won't be able to:
[o] Learn about hazards in other jurisdictions where
relatives live or children go to school;
[o] Learn about safety improvements at similar facilities in
other communities;
[o] Prioritize correction of "year-2000" computer failures
that may cause an accident;
[o] Verify reported information by comparing data
submitted elsewhere;
[o] Hold government accountable (as under the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993) for reducing hazards
nationwide;
[o] Link other national environmental, worker safety, and
public health databases;
[o] Conduct efficient education and training across many
jurisdictions;
[o] Analyze trends by geographic area, chemical, company,
or industry;
[o] Obtain timely access to information in all localities in
the needed format-on-line, on diskette, or on paper;
[o] Avoid needless information access burdens on local
governments.
[11] Chemical accidents are infrequent.
No, every fifteen minutes in the U.S., on average, a
chemical fire, spill, or explosion is reported through the
EPA's Emergency Response Notification System, or 38,305
incidents in 1997. Of these incidents, more than 1,000
caused death or injury. Further, current trends in
infrastructure disinvestment and corporate downsizing are
eroding safety. A reader survey by Industrial Safety and
Hygiene News found that "78 percent believe accidents are
more likely as employees work longer hours, handle new
assignments, and fear for their jobs." In addition,"year-
2000" computer problems pose new hazards. The
GartnerGroup, which advises businesses worldwide,
estimates that 50 percent of companies in the chemical
processing industry "will experience at least one mission
critical system failure" due to date-related computer failures,
which can lead to chemical accidents. Finally, health and
safety figures often exclude both long-term health effects
and contract employees (who are less familiar with facilities
and have higher rates of accidents).
Prepared by the Working Group on Community Right-to-
Know,
218 D Street, SE; Washington, DC 20003. Phone: (202)
544-9586.
----------------------------------------
Paul Orum
Working Group on Community Right-to-Know
218 D Street, SE; Washington, DC 20003
Ph: (202) 544-9586; E-mail: [email protected]
----------------------------------------
MapCruzin.com